Introduction
Trustees have some onerous duties. Their principle duty is to discharge themselves by accounting to their beneficiaries for the trust property. That duty or a duty akin to it should not be imposed lightly on any persons other than an express trustee, unless those persons' actions in relation to the trust property are such that they ought to attract such a duty. Furthermore, before equity imposes a liability on persons other than an express trustee (referred to as strangers to the trust) for participating in a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty there should be a clear reason for so doing. Is it because of:
1.the unconscionable behaviour of the stranger in relation to the property; or 2. the stranger's fault in not realising that the dealing with the property constitutes a breach of trust or fiduciary duty or that any assistance rendered enables a breach to be committed; or 3. the stranger's notice in respect of the breach; or 4. the stranger's unjust enrichment by receipt of property, or for more than one of these reasons? Judges and academics cannot agree on the underlying basis for the obligations imposed on strangers for receipt of property received in breach of trust or in breach of fiduciary duties or for the rendering of assistance in such breaches.
1 It is then no small wonder that with the offering of different paths, the law in relation to constructive trust liability for strangers to trusts is in disarray. This paper outlines briefly what the writer perceives to be the current direction of the law in relation to the liability of a stranger who participates in some way in a breach of trust or fiduciary duty. The purpose of the paper is twofold:
1. to "capture" in one place and examine the varying concepts that both the academics 2 and courts use to explain why equity imposes a liability on strangers for participatory breach; and 2. to examine the consequences of preferring one concept over another. 4 
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It is never far from mind that the equitable liability imposed is one allocated to the emerging "law" of constructive trusts. The major submission which this paper makes is that if proprietary considerations prevail as the basis for treating strangers differently in respect of knowing receipt of property than for knowing assistance, then the currently accepted categories for liability as set ! out in Part Three of this paper should be redefined in the manner suggested by Charles Harpum 3 j as:
1. beneficial receipt; and 2. all others which include knowing assistance and inconsistent dealing with trust property after acquiring notice of the breach of trust or fiduciary duty. Liability in this category is j generally accepted to rest on the concept of a want of probity or dishonesty. j This paper is not an analysis of agency liability 4 nor does it seek to restate the ground or reexamine old cases so well covered by others. 5 My focus in this paper is on the general principles.
PART TWO ! i The Nature of the Liability for Participatory Breach
When liability is imposed on strangers for participatory breach, liability is described as being imposed by way of constructive trust or, alternatively, the stranger is held liable as constructive trustee. Professor Malcolm Cope says that the terms "constructive trust" and "constructive trustee" are distinct in that the first term denotes proprietary relief and does not necessarily give rise to a personal liability whereas the latter denotes a personal liability only. 6 Others do not make this distinction in the nature of the "constructive trust" liability imposed but simply refer to the liability imposed as one arising in equity. For example, Ungoed-Thomas J in Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v. Cradock (No. 3) 1 said that the constructive trust: "is nothing more than a formula for equitable relief. The court of equity says that the defendant shall be liable in equity, as though he were a trustee." 8 and Austin considers that the subject matter of the liability of those who receive and are involved in breaches of trust or fiduciary duties is not one of constructive trusts "but is rather an area of substantive liability from which personal and proprietary remedies, including the constructive trust, may flow". 9 The range of remedies that can be awarded against a stranger on establishment of liability has been summarised by Rickett as follows:
1. With knowing receipt, since receipt of property is what is in issue, the remedies range from declaring a constructive trust, granting a lien, or allowing a tracing claim where the property has changed its nature, all these being equitable proprietary remedies, to the ' granting of a personal remedy to account as constructive trustee; and 2. The primary remedy in a knowing assistance case is a liability to account. I In both categories the Court can also award compensatory damages. 10 When one looks at the remedies normally imposed for participatory breach, ie, a personal account and compensatory damages, it is clear that the character of the trustee 11 is constructively imposed upon the stranger and in this respect the concept of the "constructive trust" loses any proprietary connotations. Where though a stranger has control of another's property in the "receipt" category, there is an important sense where the trust is imposed in a proprietary sense with identifiable trust property.
12
An examination of the nature of the constructive trust is outside the scope of this paper.
13
However, it can be said that the continuing debate as to whether the nature of the constructive trust is institutional or remedial and the dual remedial role, proprietary and personal, does contribute to the diverging approaches to the explanation of liability for participatory breach.
PART THREE

Barnes v. Addy and "the Categories"
Nearly all treatments of stranger liability start with reference to Barnes v. Addy. H It is an important starting point as the law on stranger liability has developed in such a manner that the real message of that case has often been "glossed" over. Charles Harpum says that in Barnes v. Addy, the Court wanted to restrict the circumstances in which an agent would be held liable as a constructive trustee and that dealing with the property is not the foundation of the complaint unless the agent becomes "chargeable with" the property.
15 Barnes v. Addy concerned the estate of a testator, who, by his will had appointed three trustees. Two of these died and the third, Addy, wished to retire. There was provision in the will for appointment of new trustees but none for a decrease in the number. Addy instructed his solicitor to prepare an instrument appointing Barnes, the husband of one of the beneficiaries, sole trustee. Even though his solicitor advised him against taking a course where there would only be one trustee the solicitor prepared the necessary instrument and it was executed by Addy and Barnes. After Addy retired from the trust Barnes misappropriated the trust funds and went bankrupt. Addy had clearly breached his trust duties.
16
The question that the Court was concerned with was whether the respective solicitors for Messrs Barnes and Addy, as their agents, could be made personally liable to the beneficiaries for the consequences of Barnes's breach of trust. This was despite the fact that both solicitors strenuously advised their clients against the transaction. The alleged assistance arose from the solicitors' separate roles in:
1. advising, perusing and preparing the instrument appointing Barnes as trustee; and 2. the subsequent introduction of Barnes by Addy' s solicitor to a broker for the sole purpose of selling some trust assets to meet previously incurred legal costs.
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Lord Selborne considered that liability should only be extended to the solicitors as strangers to the trust if:
1. they are found making themselves trustees de son tort, or actually participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que trust; or 2. as agents of a trustee and acting within their legal power they:
(a) receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property (Charles Harpum suggests knowing receipt and inconsistent dealing are both covered by this expression) , or (b) assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees.
18
On a strict interpretation of Lord Selborne's categories there is no reference to the stranger who becomes chargeable with the trust property outside the agency relationship. Lord Selborne said that the agent's liability arose under 2(b) above because of the dishonesty or fraudulent design of the stranger. Even though Barnes and Addy's respective solicitors had actual knowledge of all the facts constituting Addy's breach of trust the Court said that since they had not actual knowledge of Barnes' misappropriation of the trust funds they could not have been liable.
19
The Courts have subsequently categorised the liability of strangers generally regardless of whether the person who "receives" or "assists" is an agent 20 though it can be said that: 1. generally the cases concern agents; and 2. the fact that agents do not normally beneficially receive trust property has not always been made clear by the Courts when stating the requirements of "knowledge".
21
Professor Austin in his essay Constructive Trusts identifies three categories where strangers can be liable for participatory breach. They are as follows:
1. Where a third party acts as trustee without appointment, eg, trusteeship de son tort and cases where an agent receives property subject to an obligation to keep it and account for it as a separate fund (this paper is not concerned with this category) 2 , or 2. Receipt of property with knowledge that it has been received in breach of trust or fiduciary duty and the situation where there is no knowledge of such breach on receipt, but there is a subsequent dealing with the property "with knowledge" (which excludes agents for mere receipt if acting within the scope of their instructions); or 3. "Knowing assistance" in the breach of trust or fiduciary duty. Charles Harpum, in his thesis, separates "beneficial receipt" from "subsequent dealing" and includes "dealing" in the same category as "knowing assistance", named by him as "acting inconsistently with the terms of a trust". This categorisation has the result that a lesser level of "knowledge" of the wrongdoing is required in the former category than the latter before liability can be established. 31 Harpum considers the imposition of constructive trusteeship for beneficial receipt as property based and that "constructive knowledge" (which in some cases includes a duty to enquire but not negligence) is sufficient to impose liability. He considers all other categories are based on the implication of the stranger in the breach and knowledge of the trustee's fraudulent design is necessary. Professor Harpum considers that in this second category before the stranger is made "guarantor" for the trust property he should know or as good as know of the design.
32 This is not a unanimous view in the academic world. Professor Peter Birks differs as to the requirement of the level of knowledge of the wrong, considering "beneficial" receipt to be a strict restitutionary liability grounded in the principle of unjust enrichment, the "ignorance" of the plaintiff providing the vitiating element for the unjustness of the enrichment of the recipient. 33 His opinion is that the liability imposed upon a constructive trustee in this category is in accordance with the principle 
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QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL that any person who receives into his hands trust moneys, not being a purchaser for value without notice becomes a trustee of them.
34 Therefore the concept of notice does not go to the primary nature of the liability (fault based) but to the defence of bona fide purchase (strict). 35 In the case of knowing assistance and what he calls "ministerial receipt" there must be a want of probity . 36 We need to put to one side for the moment both Birks' view and the possibility that all liability for the imposition of constructive trusts or trusteeship in this area should be founded on the concept of a want of probity as held by Megarry V-C 
)).
If Harpum's categorisation were the one predominantly followed in the Courts, there would be a firmer basis for arguing that the liability imposed on a stranger participant for knowing receipt if limited to "beneficial receipt", was property based, separating it juristically from blowing assistance or dealing inconsistently even if there was a receipt involved in the latter two categories. I submit that if the courts are to maintain that the receipt cases are property based then it can only be if some benefit is involved. The agency cases show the reluctance of the courts to extend the knowledge categories required for the imposition of liability where there is no beneficial receipt involved. If the "benefit" is what incurs equity's higher demands then there is every reason to separate "beneficial receipt" from all other categories. 39 It is the benefit and not the receipt per se that attracts the stricter liability. On this view the ministerial recipient, ie, one who obtains no benefit on receipt, should be treated differently from the beneficial recipient. 40 The inability of the courts to definitively weed the "beneficial receipt" category out into one of its own, causes some of the juristic problems in explaining the reason for liability in the separate categories. The oft criticised "rubber" company takeover cases of banks obtained a benefit. 43 In Selangor for example the bank which advanced temporary funds was held liable for the funds "received" back in a series of cheque transactions. The provision of funds enabled Selangor to provide financial assistance in the purchase of its own shares, contrary to the provisions of the UK Companies Act 1948. Ungoed-Thomas J held the bank liable for assisting in spite of the officers of the bank acting in good faith and being unaware of what was happening although they could by inquiry have discovered the true facts. Liability was imposed on the bank because the Bank were put on enquiry or ought to have known.
The Courts, in the main, no matter the difference in opinion as to what level of knowledge must be applied to determine liability in each of the receipt and assistance categories, have shown a willingness in stating the rules relating to stranger liability to keep "knowing receipt" and "inconsistent dealing after receipt" together but despite this have been reluctant when met with an inconsistent dealing case to apply the same standard of "knowledge" as in a knowing "beneficial" receipt case to determine the question of liability".
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PART FOUR The Law
To establish liability, under the knowing assistance category there must be four elements:
1.the existence of a trust; 2. the existence of a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustee of the trust; 3. the assistance by the stranger in that design; 4. the knowledge of the stranger of: (a) the trust; (b) dishonest design; and (c) that he or she is assisting in that dishonest design 45 Peter Gibson J in Baden, said that taken together the Court must be satisfied that the alleged constructive trustee was a party or privy to dishonesty on the part of the trustee. 46 For knowing receipt there need be no dishonest design as such 47 but there must be a trust, and a receipt or inconsistent dealing with the property "with knowledge" of both the trust and that the receipt or inconsistent dealing is in breach of trust. 48 The mental states that Peter Gibson J considered could amount to knowledge for either knowing assistance or knowing receipt were as follows:
(i) actual knowledge; (ii) wilfully shutting one's eyes to the obvious; (iii) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make; Peter Gibson J said that allowing only those types of knowledge in which the conscience of the alleged constructive trustee was affected would accord with the equitable basis of constructive trusteeship. 50 He felt though that the necessity for a "want of probity" was too restrictive of the circumstances in which a court would impose a constructive trust. There is a divergence of opinion in England, Australia and New Zealand as to what level of knowledge is required to establish liability in both knowing receipt and knowing assistance cases and whether in both or just the latter there must be a clear "dishonest or fraudulent purpose", the Baden categories (i)-(iii) designated as "actual knowledge" supplying this element and the Baden categories (iv) and (v) designated "constructive knowledge" or as in some cases more unfortunately styled, "constructive notice"
51 not. The Selangor and Karak cases referred to previously have given rise to what has been called the "honest and reasonable man test" 52 of constructive knowledge (categories (w) and (v) in Baden) ie, the test will impute knowledge and therefore constitute trusteeship where there is knowledge of circumstances that would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable man or put him on inquiry. Neither the Selangor or the Karak cases offer any guidance on the underlying basis for imposing liability. In Selangor for example, a case treated as a knowing assistance case,^ Ungoed-Thomas J generally referred to the constructive trustee as an "equitable conception" and did not investigate the equitable basis for liability except to say that it was not criminal, tortious or contractual. Ungoed-Thomas J referred to equity' s concerns to give effect to equitable interests re tracing and the doctrine of constructive notice in conveyancing transactions, and felt that in general that persons with actual or constructive notice of rights should be fixed with knowledge of them and considered this the "equitable approach of equity".
54 Such a view would accord with any remedy being property based but makes no allowance for the knowing assistance category being based on "fraud" or a "want of probity".
It will be argued in Part 5 that "negligence", Baden category (v), was wrongly imported into this area, (in both cases the plaintiffs succeeded on their negligence claims as well). The cases are inconsistent with dicta in decisions up to the Court of Appeal decision in Agip (Africa) Ltd v. Jackson. 55 In none of the appellate decisions up to Agip is there a suggestion that "constructive knowledge" alone is sufficient in a "knowing assistance" case. An element of lack of probity or "dishonest design" is necessary. In the Court of Appeal in Agip, Fox LJ (with whom the other two members of the Court agreed) adopted Ungoed-Thomas J's statement in Selangor to the effect that constructive knowledge is sufficient to establish liability in a knowing assistance case. In Agip, cheques had been altered by Agip's "in house" accountant and so that the proceeds could reach bank accounts controlled by companies of the accountant's associates, a firm of Accountants, had, as intermediary for the transfer of funds from one bank to another, provided a shelf company and given instructions regarding the further transfer of funds to the Bank. The Court of Appeal held that the Accountants were personally liable to account to Agip for the amounts of money they must have known they were laundering, having assisted in a breach of Agip's "in house" accountant's fiduciary duty to Agip. Because of Fox LJ's insistence that whether the accountants had acted honestly was the question to be addressed 60 1 submit that Agip is consistent with the requirement of a "want of probity" in knowing assistance cases. The approach of the Court of Appeal was to base any enquiry on the circumstances known and not on a negligence duty of care as in the Selangor case. The defendants did not give evidence and the court was left to infer their state of knowledge in circumstances where the defendants "must have known they were laundering money". The case is a warning not to place too much emphasis on a strict categorisation of mental states to establish knowledge. The underlying basis for liability in a knowing assistance case is a "want of probity". As Millet J said in the Court of first instance in Agip:
"According to Peter Gibson J, a person in category (ii) or (iii) will be taken to have actual knowledge, while a person in categories (iv) or (v) has constructive notice only. I gratefully adopt the classification but would warn against over refinement or a too ready assumption that categories (iv) or (v) are necessarily cases of constructive notice only. The true distinction is between honesty and dishonesty. It is essentially a jury question. If a man does not draw the obvious inferences or make the obvious inquiries, the question is: why not?"
61
Peter Gibson J himself in Baden had given a warning about being astute to find "knowledge" in the absence of "actual knowledge" in category (v) in particular. 62 The latest English decisions referred to below accept that Peter Gibson J's first three classifications in Baden will establish liability in both knowing receipt and knowing assistance cases emphasising that in knowing assistance there must be some "want of probity". The decisions, all of which arise in the commercial context, acknowledge the distinction between beneficial receipt and inconsistent dealing where the receipt is not beneficial. The Courts are reluctant to apply the constructive knowledge test in the commercial context where money has "passed through" the defendant's hands even though the receipt was for the defendant's benefit. The decisions are complicated by the presence of some form of consideration.
Eagle 
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(known to be in financial difficulties), to discharge his sub-underwriting liabilities, were in fact funds of Eagle Trust. The funds had been misapplied by Ferriday in breach of his director's fiduciary obligations to the company. SBS moved to have the statement of claim struck out as showing no reasonable cause of action on the basis that it could not be shown that SBS had knowledge that the monies were misapplied trust funds. In giving judgment to strike out the claim Vinelott J confirmed by way of dicta that in the case of knowing assistance:
"There must have been something amounting to want of probity on his part. Constructive notice is not enough, though, as I have said, knowledge may be inferred in the absence of evidence by the defendant if such knowledge would have been imputed to an honest and reasonable man".
64
Vinelott J relied on Millet J's judgment at first instance in Agip, and identified the different underlying basis of participatory liability as "rights of priority in relation to property taken by a legal owner for his own benefit" in knowing receipt cases and the "furtherance of fraud" in knowing assistance cases.
65 Vinelott J agreed with Millet J that there were the two sub-categories in knowing receipt referred to in Part 2 of this paper. He thought there was no reason why a stricter standard of knowledge should apply with receipt based liability. 66 After concluding that there was no need to make a decision on whether in the knowing receipt category (where the property is not retained) more than actual knowledge is necessary for liability, he relied on such cases as Manchester Trust v. Furness, 67 Thomson v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd 168 and Blundell v. Blundell 69 to draw the conclusion that notice was not enough in the commercial context to impose a liability on the recipient who has received money in the ordinary course of business to discharge a commercial liability. It must be shown that the circumstances are such that knowledge that the payment was improper can be imputed to the receiver. 70 Vinelott J said that knowledge could be inferred in such a case if:
"the circumstances are such that an honest and reasonable man would have inferred that the moneys were probably trust moneys and were being misapplied, and would either not have accepted them or would have kept them separate until he had satisfied himself that the payer was entitled to use them in discharge of the liability".
71
Has Vinelott J created a new class of the knowing receiver, ie, one who receives beneficially in discharge of a liability in the commercial context but has no identifiable property remaining in his hands? Vinelott J's approach is not so much directed at the distinction between beneficial and non beneficial receipt but whether the recipient still retains the property. He was reluctant to impose a personal liability in circumstances where the property has gone unless there is actual knowledge of the breach of trust.
72 This position is in contrast to the common law actions for money had and received, where the sole fact that the recipient has disposed of the property is no defence.
The same approach was adopted by Knox J in of his fiduciary duties as a director of Eagle Trust. Knox J considered that "the relegation of a purchaser for value to a category more, rather than less, exposed to claims of constructive trusteeship to be misconceived". He declined to extend the knowledge categories for knowing receipt beyond the first three Baden categories in what was as he saw a typical commercial situation. Knox J said that in such a situation it would not be appropriate for the court to be astute to find circumstances which could indicate knowledge by a purchaser of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of directors of a vendor company. 75 He did, however, accept that the last two Baden categories were not always cases of constructive notice only and said:
"it may well be that the underlying principle which runs through the authorities regarding commercial transactions is that the court will impute knowledge, on the basis of what a reasonable person would have learnt, to a person who is guilty of commercially unacceptable conduct in the particular context involved."
76
The tension between the personal liability often imposed for participatory breach and the priority rules in property transactions is evident in these two cases. Rights of priority raise different issues to personal liability. In the former, someone has the property and the question is does that person take subject to a prior equity? The worst scenario is that the person stands to lose the property or take subject to a prior equity. An investment might be lost. Often the "proprietary" constructive trust will be the appropriate remedy. With stranger liability, the focus is different. The imposition of a personal liability is primarily to compensate a plaintiff for loss.
77
Often the one sought to be made liable no longer has the property.
The adoption of the property base for knowing receipt has accounted for those who favour it, accepting constructive knowledge to let in liability, though noticeably the concept of negligence when one is put on enquiry, is not generally accepted.
In Polly Peck International pic v. Nadir and other (No. 2 J, 78 a recent decision of the Court of Appeal on the subject, the facts were briefly as follows. Nadir was the principle director of PPI. The Court accepted that there was a breach of fiduciary duty by Nadir as a director of PPI where Nadir had dishonestly diverted PPI funds to improper purposes in having the funds channelled through the bank account of a private bank, IBK, a subsidiary of PPI and of which Nadir was also a director. IBK held an account with the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Central Bank and IBK had accounts at London's Midland Bank International. In a number of transactions Nadir, misappropriating PPI funds, deposited sterling in the Midland Bank IBK account and the sums deposited were: -in nine transactions transferred to the Central Bank Account and forwarded by the Central Bank from its Midland bank account to the IBK account at the Central Bank's office in Northern Cyprus; and -in the remainder exchanged for lire by the Central Bank through its Midland Bank Account and the lire then sent by the Central Bank to the same IBK account referred to above. In respect of the nine transactions, Scott LJ said that "knowing assistance" was the relevant category, but that in the remainder since the Central Bank received the sterling to its own benefit "as purchaser" (the bank exchanged the sterling for lire) knowing receipt was the relevant 
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QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL category. 79 The appeal arose from Millet J's decision to grant a Mareva injunction in respect of the assets of the Central Bank. The Central Bank appealed against the order. The Court of Appeal considered one ground to be taken into consideration in whether the Mareva injunction should be discharged was how strong the case was against the Central Bank with respect to the constructive trust claim. Scott LJ (with whom Stocker LJ and Lord Donaldson Master of the Rolls agreed) referred to Agip, Baden, Eagle Trust and Cowan de Groot, and said that the critical questions were whether the Central Bank knew or must be treated as knowing that the funds were PPI funds and were being misappropriated. With respect to the second of these Scott LJ said that mere curiosity or the silence of the Bank to explain in suspicious circumstances would not be sufficient to establish knowledge 80 nor did he accept an argument as to "the sheer scale of the payment". He said that in order to establish liability:
1. In the "knowing assistance" category, something amounting to dishonesty or want of probity on the part of the defendant must be shown; 81 and 2. With respect to the receipt of funds, the misapplication of funds does not need to be fraudulent but the receiver does need to know that the funds are trust funds and that they are being misapplied.
82
Scott LJ considered that with respect to the second category, actual knowledge would suffice but in response to Counsel's submission, he doubted whether it would suffice to establish liability that "the defendant can be shown to have had knowledge of facts which would have put an honest and reasonable man on inquiry ...". 83 He also said that: "The various categories of mental state identified in Baden's case are not rigid categories with clear and precise boundaries. One category may merge imperceptibly into another." 84 Scott LJ did not think the appeal was the time to decide whether all the mental states identified by Peter Gibson J in Baden would suffice to establish knowledge for the purpose of the knowing receipt category. The final points that Scott LJ made although with respect to the tracing claim as to whether the Central Bank was a purchaser for value "without notice" were that:
-the Courts would not be willing to extend the equitable doctrine of "constructive" notice from land where title was in dispute, to commercial transactions.
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-the degree of knowledge for the constructive trust claim would be the same as for the equitable tracing claim.
86
The latest Court of Appeal decision then, accepts the two categories of knowing receipt and knowing assistance albeit with no acknowledgment of the underlying basis or bases for liability. It would seem improbable from either the approach or the dicta of the Court that the Selangor approach will be accepted for knowing receipt. 87 The Court did not seem to think this approach would suffice and for the purpose of examining PPI's claim in the light most favourable to it, restricted its examination of the actual circumstances and what the Central Bank could have inferred from those circumstances. In the absence of actual or close to actual knowledge, there is a clear reluctance to extend the constructive trust/trusteeship into the arena of commercial transactions. .,^ two company directors were held by the Supreme Court to be personally liable to Air Canada when the company of which they were the directors, failed to keep money paid by customers for Airline tickets separate in a trust account for the Airline as opposed to mixing the money in a general account. The Supreme Court held unanimously that the directors were liable on the basis of their participation in the breach of trust, being the controlling minds of the company. It was accepted that in the case the directors' breach was fraudulent and dishonest but McLachlin J thought it was not necessary to resolve the question already resolved in England in this category as to whether the test of knowledge in the participation was objective or subjective. Iacobucci J, delivering the main judgment of the Court, pointed to two separate Canadian lines of authority, where persons could be held liable where there was an innocent but negligent participation in a fraudulent breach of trust.
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In New Zealand, in the latest Court of Appeal decision, Gathergood v. Blundell & Brown, 90 the Court held that whether knowing assistance or receipt was applicable, the question was whether the person implicated "knew of the material facts giving rise to the existence of the duty and its breach". If this means there is no requirement for a want of probity in knowing assistance cases, then the decision is contrary to dicta in Westpac Banking Corporation v. Savin.
91
Gathergood, a real estate agent, purchased his principal's property but failed to both properly account to his principal for the deposit monies under the contract and obtain his principal's authorisation to the lesser deposit. He onsold the property to a third party at a profit without his principal's authority. His principal, the Vendor, sought to recover the profit. Gathergood and his wife had left New Zealand and the profit which had been accounted for to Mrs Gathergood could not be traced. The Vendor sought to make Gathergood's solicitor, Leishman, personally liable to account for the profit on the ground of either Leishman's receipt or assistance in the breach of fiduciary duties owed by Gathergood. The alleged "assistance" arose out of Leishman's dual roles in acting as solicitor and as trustee for Gathergood in the contracts for the purchase and "onsale". As solicitor in both transactions the monies passed through his trust account.
The majority of the Court appeared to think that Leishman had both knowingly received and knowingly assisted Gathergood in the latter's breach of fiduciary duties (there was no indication of beneficial receipt). Cooke P cited Fox LJ in Agip and considered that since Leishman had sent a letter to the Vendors' solicitors in his capacity as solicitor to Gathergood stating that the deposit was short from the amount stated in the contract, that he "knew the facts material to whether Mr Gathergood's fiduciary relationship to the vendor continued.
92 Knowing the facts, he could not be heard to say that he was ignorant of the law as to fiduciary duties". 93 Cooke P and Gault J used the expressions "implicated" and "participated" in the breach of fiduciary duty respectively, though Gault J did consider the case as one of both receipt and knowing assistance.
From Leishman's point of view it was unfortunate that he was a solicitor. The decision whilst not referring to any possible underlying principle for imposing liability, adopts a similar approach to that of Smith J in Australia in Banque Nationale de Paris. Although Smith J was concerned with 48 QUEENSLAND UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL a knowing receipt case he held the bank was also liable in the knowing assistance category. 95 The decision is also consistent with Consul in Australia where in the knowing assistance category there is no requirement for dishonesty provided the stranger knew all the facts which would have indicated the impropriety to a reasonable man.
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PART FIVE Policy Considerations -The Possible Underlying Principles
It is important to examine the reasons relied on by the Courts for imposing a personal liability on the stranger for participatory breach, and the consequences of preferring one approach to another. The following possibilities arise for consideration, ie, whether the stranger's liability rests on:
-a consideration of what is equitably just or unconscionable; -unjust enrichment; -a proprietary notion as opposed to one that essentially looks to the conduct of the stranger in finding a "lack of probity" or "dishonesty"; -standards or notions of negligence; or one and any other depending on whether the stranger is the receiver or the assister.
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Equitably Just Buckley LJ in Belmont Finance Corp. Ltd v. William Furniture Ltd, 98 thought that to depart from Lord Selborne's formula in Barnes v. Addy as to the requirement of dishonesty to establish liability in a knowing assistance case and to look instead to what was "equitably just" would lead to an unacceptable level of uncertainty in the law. In contrast, Thomas J in New Zealand has taken the approach that the constructive trust is a broad equitable remedy for reversing that which is inequitable or unconscionable. 99 His approach, which examines the circumstances between the parties and not just the defendant's knowledge, 100 has met with judicial criticism. Wylie J in Equiticorp m preferred (at least in a knowing assistance case) the concept of a want of probity which concentrates on the conscience of the defendant. Tipping J in Marshall Futures v. Marshall 102 "preferred the herald of equity to be better dressed", saying that dishonesty is the feature for the knowing assistance category and implying in receipt cases that property considerations were relevant. He thought any general ground of unconscionability should be limited to the special field of de facto marriage cases. 
